Vulnerability Of National Interdependent Infrastructure Networks to Spatially Localised Hazards by Zorn, Conrad et al.
VULNERABILITY OF NATIONAL INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
NETWORKS TO SPATIALLY LOCALISED HAZARDS
Conrad Zorna,b,  Scott Thackerb,  Raghav Pantb, and Asaad Shamseldina


















• The presented results highlight the importance for considering dependencies
between infrastructures when modelling disruptions at national and regional
scales, with the potential to almost double the disrupted population (on
average) when compared to modelling infrastructures in isolation.
• We demonstrate there are limitations in restricting infrastructure vulnerability
analyses to regional/authoritative boundaries due to the significant reliance on
infrastructure network connectivity between many regions.
• While resilience building is important at the component / local asset level,
significant benefits may be possible through the introduction of either additional
regional infrastructure links increasing redundancy or through more localised
infrastructure service provisions – such as distributed electricity generation.
• Further work continues in seeking updated/higher resolution data sets and in the
development of infrastructure sector models. In particular, collaborations with
Davies et al. [Poster 66] and Liu et al. [Poster 67] to incorporate the recovery
and additional quantifiable metrics for national, regional, and specific hazard
scenarios such as AF8.
For related outputs, questions, or discussion contact conrad.zorn@ouce.ox.ac.uk
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INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure networks are geographically distributed systems spanning
multiple scales. These networks are increasingly interconnected and dependent on
each other for normal operation. Localised asset failures from natural (or
intentional) hazards can propagate across multiple networks, greatly increasing the
magnitude and spatial extents of disruptions – potentially affecting those far
removed from an initiating failure event.
This poster presents an overview of our integrated framework for quantifying and
identifying systemic vulnerabilities across multiple connected national
infrastructures with application to New Zealand.
ADOPTED FRAMEWORK
Model Build: Spatial infrastructure asset data is
assembled across regions to produce national
infrastructure networks (Fig. 2). Source-sink
connectivity paths are mapped within and between
networks where functional dependencies exist
(Fig. 1). User demands are allocated to assets
using provided statistics/ catchments/zones and
spatial analyses at meshblock resolutions.
Disruptive Scenario: Initial network component
failures are assumed based on the spatial
intersection with a pre-determined hazard extent.
Failure Propagation: Further network failures
(partial or complete) propagate where flow/
functional connectivity pathways are disrupted
both within and across networks (Fig. 1) after
allowing for assumed redundancies and rerouting.
Disruption Metrics: Direct disruptions comprise
those initiated from within a network after
allowing for redundancies and rerouting of
connectivity paths. Indirect disruptions result from
failures which are initiated beyond the network in
question due to functional dependencies with
other networks. The outage extent is delineated
by the combined spatial footprints of failed
components and dependent users, where known.
Fig. 2. Representations of the studied infrastructure networks with insets for the Wellington Region. □ represents major service assets
(i.e. wastewater treatment plants, water sources, or landfills), ● represents common assets (i.e. pump stations, reservoirs,
transfer stations), and ▬ represent the connectivity paths between nodes. Shading delineates the collection catchment or
distribution zone extents for nodes. Some nodes, edges, and shading are omitted for clarity.
SIMULATION RESULTS AND VISUALISATION
We divide New Zealand into a tessellated grid of 4590 equilateral hexagon cells to represent spatially localised
hazards. Each cell is individually disrupted and disruption metrics are computed according to the outlined adopted
framework (as shown on left). Aggregating across the simulation set, Fig. 3 suggests (on average) 54% of the total
user disruptions can be attributed to direct network connectivity losses – the remaining being a result of outages
initiated through infrastructure dependencies. This highlights the importance for considering interdependencies in
quantifying potential disruptions for a specific hazard event and when prioritising resilience building measures. This is
especially the case where electricity, road, and water supply networks are involved as these appear to be the leading
initiating infrastructures of interdependent disruptions.
Spatially, Fig. 4 presents the disruptive risk, magnitude x frequency (i.e. the number of user disruptions multiplied
by the frequency of which infrastructure network components or populations within the cell are disrupted by other
spatially localised hazards) and the reach of disruptions (beyond the host Civil Defence Emergency Management
region). As a result, a number of corridors crucial for inter-region infrastructure service are identified such as those
feeding into the West Coast and Gisborne Regions. This implies these regions are highly reliant on external service
provisions and particularly vulnerable to national disconnection should certain assets within the identified hazard
cells fail. The Auckland isthmus is commonly highlighted with significant potential for both frequent and high
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Fig. 1. Directed dependencies for normal operation represented within the New Zealand
application. An infrastructure i reliance on infrastructure j is represented as i→j.
Fig. 4.
Spatial representations of 
disruptive risk (shading) and 
disruptive reach (size). Disruptive 
risk is assumed the product of 
consequence (aggregated user 
disruptions) and frequency of 
disruptions to the cell resulting 
from other hazard simulations. 
Disruptive reach is presented in 
terms of the occurrence of a 
disruption to users beyond the 
regional boundary. Inset shows 
the Wellington Region with 
background population shading.
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